Division 1(1) The rule of law that it is conclusively presumed that an injury was not the cause of death of a person if the person died after the expiration of the period of a year and a day after the date on which the person received the injury is abrogated.(2) This section does not apply in respect of an injury received before the commencement of this section.
18 Murder and manslaughter defined
(1)(a) Murder shall be taken to have been committed where the act of the accused, or thing by him or her omitted to be done, causing the death charged, was done or omitted with reckless indifference to human life, or with intent to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm upon some person, or done in an attempt to commit, or during or immediately after the commission, by the accused, or some accomplice with him or her, of a crime punishable by imprisonment for life or for 25 years.(b) Every other punishable homicide shall be taken to be manslaughter.(2)(a) No act or omission which was not malicious, or for which the accused had lawful cause or excuse, shall be within this section.(b) No punishment or forfeiture shall be incurred by any person who kills another by misfortune only.
(1) A person who commits the crime of murder is liable to imprisonment for life.(2) A person sentenced to imprisonment for life for the crime of murder is to serve that sentence for the term of the person’s natural life.(3) Nothing in this section affects the operation of section 21 (1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (which authorises the passing of a lesser sentence than imprisonment for life).(4) This section applies to murder committed before or after the commencement of this section.(5) However, this section does not apply where committal proceedings (or proceedings by way of ex officio indictment) for the murder were instituted against the convicted person before the commencement of this section. In such a case, section 19 as in force before that commencement continues to apply.(6) Nothing in this section affects the prerogative of mercy.
19B Mandatory life sentences for murder of police officers
(1) A court is to impose a sentence of imprisonment for life for the murder of a police officer if the murder was committed:(a) while the police officer was executing his or her duty, or(b) as a consequence of, or in retaliation for, actions undertaken by that or any other police officer in the execution of his or her duty,and if the person convicted of the murder:(c) knew or ought reasonably to have known that the person killed was a police officer, and(d) intended to kill the police officer or was engaged in criminal activity that risked serious harm to police officers.(2) A person sentenced to imprisonment for life under this section is to serve the sentence for the term of the person’s natural life.(3) This section does not apply to a person convicted of murder:(a) if the person was under the age of 18 years at the time the murder was committed, or(b) if the person had a significant cognitive impairment at that time (not being a temporary self-induced impairment).(4) If this section requires a person to be sentenced to imprisonment for life, nothing in section 21 (or any other provision) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 or in any other Act or law authorises a court to impose a lesser or alternative sentence.(5) Nothing in this section affects the obligation of a court to impose a sentence of imprisonment for life on a person convicted of murder in accordance with section 61 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.(6) Nothing in this section affects the prerogative of mercy.(7) This section applies to offences committed after the commencement of this section.
20 Child murder—when child deemed born alive
On the trial of a person for the murder of a child, such child shall be held to have been born alive if it has breathed, and has been wholly born into the world whether it has had an independent circulation or not.
21 Child murder by mother—verdict of contributing to death etc
Whosoever, being a woman delivered of a child is indicted for its murder, shall, if the jury acquit her of the murder, and specially find that she has in any manner wilfully contributed to the death of such child, whether during delivery, or at or after its birth, or has wilfully caused any violence, the mark of which has been found on its body, be liable to imprisonment for ten years.
22 Trial for child murder—verdict of concealment of birth
Where, on the trial of a person for the murder or manslaughter of a child, the jury are not satisfied that the person is guilty thereof, but are satisfied that the person is guilty of an offence within section 85, they may acquit the person of the offence charged and find the person guilty of an offence under the said section, and the person shall be liable to punishment accordingly.
(1) Where a woman by any wilful act or omission causes the death of her child, being a child under the age of twelve months, but at the time of the act or omission the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child or by reason of the effect of lactation consequent upon the birth of the child, then, notwithstanding that the circumstances were such that but for this section the offence would have amounted to murder, she shall be guilty of infanticide, and may for such offence be dealt with and punished as if she had been guilty of the offence of manslaughter of such child.(2) Where upon the trial of a woman for the murder of her child, being a child under the age of twelve months, the jury are of opinion that she by any wilful act or omission caused its death, but that at the time of the act or omission the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to such child or by reason of the effect of lactation consequent upon the birth of the child, then the jury may, notwithstanding that the circumstances were such that but for the provisions of this section they might have returned a verdict of murder, return in lieu thereof a verdict of infanticide, and the woman may be dealt with and punished as if she had been guilty of the offence of manslaughter of the said child.(3) Nothing in this section shall affect the power of the jury upon an indictment for the murder of a child to return a verdict of manslaughter or a verdict of not guilty on the ground of insanity, or a verdict of concealment of birth.
23 Trial for murder—provocation
(1) Where, on the trial of a person for murder, it appears that the act or omission causing death was an act done or omitted under provocation and, but for this subsection and the provocation, the jury would have found the accused guilty of murder, the jury shall acquit the accused of murder and find the accused guilty of manslaughter.(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), an act or omission causing death is an act done or omitted under provocation where:(a) the act or omission is the result of a loss of self-control on the part of the accused that was induced by any conduct of the deceased (including grossly insulting words or gestures) towards or affecting the accused, and(b) that conduct of the deceased was such as could have induced an ordinary person in the position of the accused to have so far lost self-control as to have formed an intent to kill, or to inflict grievous bodily harm upon, the deceased,whether that conduct of the deceased occurred immediately before the act or omission causing death or at any previous time.(3) For the purpose of determining whether an act or omission causing death was an act done or omitted under provocation as provided by subsection (2), there is no rule of law that provocation is negatived if:(a) there was not a reasonable proportion between the act or omission causing death and the conduct of the deceased that induced the act or omission,(b) the act or omission causing death was not an act done or omitted suddenly, or(c) the act or omission causing death was an act done or omitted with any intent to take life or inflict grievous bodily harm.(4) Where, on the trial of a person for murder, there is any evidence that the act causing death was an act done or omitted under provocation as provided by subsection (2), the onus is on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the act or omission causing death was not an act done or omitted under provocation.(5) This section does not exclude or limit any defence to a charge of murder.
23A Substantial impairment by abnormality of mind
(1) A person who would otherwise be guilty of murder is not to be convicted of murder if:(a) at the time of the acts or omissions causing the death concerned, the person’s capacity to understand events, or to judge whether the person’s actions were right or wrong, or to control himself or herself, was substantially impaired by an abnormality of mind arising from an underlying condition, and(b) the impairment was so substantial as to warrant liability for murder being reduced to manslaughter.(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) (b), evidence of an opinion that an impairment was so substantial as to warrant liability for murder being reduced to manslaughter is not admissible.(3) If a person was intoxicated at the time of the acts or omissions causing the death concerned, and the intoxication was self-induced intoxication (within the meaning of section 428A), the effects of that self-induced intoxication are to be disregarded for the purpose of determining whether the person is not liable to be convicted of murder by virtue of this section.(4) The onus is on the person accused to prove that he or she is not liable to be convicted of murder by virtue of this section.(5) A person who but for this section would be liable, whether as principal or accessory, to be convicted of murder is to be convicted of manslaughter instead.(6) The fact that a person is not liable to be convicted of murder in respect of a death by virtue of this section does not affect the question of whether any other person is liable to be convicted of murder in respect of that death.(7) If, on the trial of a person for murder, the person contends:(a) that the person is entitled to be acquitted on the ground that the person was mentally ill at the time of the acts or omissions causing the death concerned, or(b) that the person is not liable to be convicted of murder by virtue of this section,evidence may be offered by the prosecution tending to prove the other of those contentions, and the Court may give directions as to the stage of the proceedings at which that evidence may be offered.(8) In this section:underlying condition means a pre-existing mental or physiological condition, other than a condition of a transitory kind.
Whosoever commits the crime of manslaughter shall be liable to imprisonment for 25 years:Provided that, in any case, if the Judge is of the opinion that, having regard to all the circumstances, a nominal punishment would be sufficient, the Judge may discharge the jury from giving any verdict, and such discharge shall operate as an acquittal.