Homicide(1) The rule of law that it is conclusively presumed that an injury was not the cause of death of a person if the person died after the expiration of the period of a year and a day after the date on which the person received the injury is abrogated.(2) This section does not apply in respect of an injury received before the commencement of this section.
18 Murder and manslaughter defined
(1)(a) Murder shall be taken to have been committed where the act of the accused, or thing by him omitted to be done, causing the death charged, was done or omitted with reckless indifference to human life, or with intent to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm upon some person, or done in an attempt to commit, or during or immediately after the commission, by the accused, or some accomplice with him, of a crime punishable by penal servitude for life or for 25 years.(b) Every other punishable homicide shall be taken to be manslaughter.(2)(a) No act or omission which was not malicious, or for which the accused had lawful cause or excuse, shall be within this section.(b) No punishment or forfeiture shall be incurred by any person who kills another by misfortune only, or in his own defence.
(1) A person who commits the crime of murder is liable to penal servitude for life.(2) A person sentenced to penal servitude for life for the crime of murder is to serve that sentence for the term of the person’s natural life.(3) Nothing in this section affects the operation of section 442 (which authorises the passing of a lesser sentence than penal servitude for life).(4) This section applies to murder committed before or after the commencement of this section.(5) However, this section does not apply where committal proceedings (or proceedings by way of ex officio indictment) for the murder were instituted against the convicted person before the commencement of this section. In such a case, section 19 as in force before that commencement continues to apply.(6) Nothing in this section affects the prerogative of mercy.
20 Child murder—when child deemed born alive
On the trial of a person for the murder of a child, such child shall be held to have been born alive if it has breathed, and has been wholly born into the world whether it has had an independent circulation or not.
21 Child murder by mother—verdict of contributing to death etc
Whosoever, being a woman delivered of a child is indicted for its murder, shall, if the jury acquit her of the murder, and specially find that she has in any manner wilfully contributed to the death of such child, whether during delivery, or at or after its birth, or has wilfully caused any violence, the mark of which has been found on its body, be liable to penal servitude for ten years.
22 Trial for child murder—verdict of concealment of birth
Where, on the trial of a person for the murder or manslaughter of a child, the jury are not satisfied that he is guilty thereof, but are satisfied that he is guilty of an offence within section 85, they may acquit him of the offence charged and find him guilty of an offence under the said section, and he shall be liable to punishment accordingly.
(1) Where a woman by any wilful act or omission causes the death of her child, being a child under the age of twelve months, but at the time of the act or omission the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child or by reason of the effect of lactation consequent upon the birth of the child, then, notwithstanding that the circumstances were such that but for this section the offence would have amounted to murder, she shall be guilty of infanticide, and may for such offence be dealt with and punished as if she had been guilty of the offence of manslaughter of such child.(2) Where upon the trial of a woman for the murder of her child, being a child under the age of twelve months, the jury are of opinion that she by any wilful act or omission caused its death, but that at the time of the act or omission the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to such child or by reason of the effect of lactation consequent upon the birth of the child, then the jury may, notwithstanding that the circumstances were such that but for the provisions of this section they might have returned a verdict of murder, return in lieu thereof a verdict of infanticide, and the woman may be dealt with and punished as if she had been guilty of the offence of manslaughter of the said child.(3) Nothing in this section shall affect the power of the jury upon an indictment for the murder of a child to return a verdict of manslaughter or a verdict of not guilty on the ground of insanity, or a verdict of concealment of birth.
23 Trial for murder—provocation
(1) Where, on the trial of a person for murder, it appears that the act or omission causing death was an act done or omitted under provocation and, but for this subsection and the provocation, the jury would have found the accused guilty of murder, the jury shall acquit the accused of murder and find the accused guilty of manslaughter.(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), an act or omission causing death is an act done or omitted under provocation where:(a) the act or omission is the result of a loss of self-control on the part of the accused that was induced by any conduct of the deceased (including grossly insulting words or gestures) towards or affecting the accused, and(b) that conduct of the deceased was such as could have induced an ordinary person in the position of the accused to have so far lost self-control as to have formed an intent to kill, or to inflict grievous bodily harm upon, the deceased,whether that conduct of the deceased occurred immediately before the act or omission causing death or at any previous time.(3) For the purpose of determining whether an act or omission causing death was an act done or omitted under provocation as provided by subsection (2), there is no rule of law that provocation is negatived if:(a) there was not a reasonable proportion between the act or omission causing death and the conduct of the deceased that induced the act or omission,(b) the act or omission causing death was not an act done or omitted suddenly, or(c) the act or omission causing death was an act done or omitted with any intent to take life or inflict grievous bodily harm.(4) Where, on the trial of a person for murder, there is any evidence that the act causing death was an act done or omitted under provocation as provided by subsection (2), the onus is on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the act or omission causing death was not an act done or omitted under provocation.(5) This section does not exclude or limit any defence to a charge of murder.
(1) Where, on the trial of a person for murder, it appears that at the time of the acts or omissions causing the death charged the person was suffering from such abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury) as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for the acts or omissions, he shall not be convicted of murder.(2) It shall be upon the person accused to prove that he is by virtue of subsection (1) not liable to be convicted of murder.(3) A person who but for subsection (1) would be liable, whether as principal or as accessory, to be convicted of murder shall be liable instead to be convicted of manslaughter.(4) The fact that a person is by virtue of subsection (1) not liable to be convicted of murder in respect of a death charged shall not affect the question whether any other person is liable to be convicted of murder in respect of that death.(5) Where, on the trial of a person for murder, the person contends:(a) that he is entitled to be acquitted on the ground that he was mentally ill at the time of the acts or omissions causing the death charged, or(b) that he is by virtue of subsection (1) not liable to be convicted of murder,evidence may be offered by the Crown tending to prove the other of those contentions, and the Court may give directions as to the stage of the proceedings at which that evidence may be offered.
Whosoever commits the crime of manslaughter shall be liable to penal servitude for 25 years:Provided that, in any case, if the Judge is of the opinion that, having regard to all the circumstances, a nominal punishment would be sufficient, he may discharge the jury from giving any verdict, and such discharge shall operate as an acquittal.